Party Leadership Changes

Why are leaders still important in modern day politics ?

Although leaders of parties have always been important in determinants of a party’s direction, in embodying its values and being important in election contests, evidence suggests they are becoming more important.

This is a combination of several factors: presidentialism of politics at election time and the accompanying increasing centralisation of power within government as seen with the growth of prime ministers’ offices and departments. This has been accompanied by the decline of party loyalty, and the personalisation of politics that have made leaders even more important.

Rod Tiffen’s excellent 2016 book, Disposable Leaders: Media and Leadership Coups from Menzies to Abbott (New South) reminds us of the precariousness of modern-day political leadership.

Federally, only three prime ministers have retired at a time of their own choosing – Barton our first prime minister in 1903, Andrew Fisher in 1915 and Menzies in 1966. The rest have lost office at an election, died in office, or as Tiffen points out, have lost their position as the result of internal party conflicts and been deposed of by rivals. Such turnover of leaders is even more pronounced when a party is in opposition.

When once leaders could survive the normal setbacks of politics like some sort of gaffe in parliament, a policy blunder here or there, an election loss or for an incumbent government, a substantial reduction of seats if not a defeat, such setbacks are no longer tolerated.

While this was once particularly the case for parties like the Liberal Party that historically, structurally and organisationally have been built around the parliamentary leader, these pressures are also infecting its Labor counterparts. We could not imagine the Labor Party these days putting loyalty to the leader above election failures as it did to Evatt who remained leader despite losing four elections in a row (1951, 1954, 1955, 1958). That has long gone. Labor, determined to take no chances, desperate as any party to be in office, was ruthless in replacing incumbent Bill Hayden, despite his efforts to restore Labor’s fortunes following Whitlam’s mess, with the more charismatic Bob Hawke on the eve of the 1983 election to ensure victory – which it did.

As Tiffen says, says, “Until the 1970s the major route to party leadership was through seniority, and patience was considered a virtue” (p4). Since then the turnover has not only accelerated, but is done more brutally by sudden coups, and humiliating betrayals of leaders by once former allies.

There have been exceptions. Alexander Downer, leader of the Liberal Party when in opposition knew he was failing and stood aside to let John Howard return to the position he had lost in 1989 when he was betrayed in favour of the supposedly more politically attractive Andrew Peacock.

This increasing turnover of leaders – both in government and opposition – has also been prompted by the increase in public opinion polling in terms of its regularity and intensity of a party’s and leader’s popular voting rating. This has allowed a leader’s public standing to be more exposed and given the importance of leaders in projecting a party’s profile, has made them more vulnerable. It means disquiet about a leader’s performance, not unusual even in the good times, can get greater currency because of such ongoing polling. It can thus generate more leadership coups or attempted coups and leadership changes.

These trends can be further seen in federal politics where we have had three prime ministerial changes for both Labor (2007-2013) and Coalition governments (2013-2022). This was replicated by those in opposition too. In the last six months there have been leadership coups in Liberal state oppositions in NSW, South Australia and Victoria. It has also infected the National Party which once boasted of its stability compared to their Liberal partners. Since 2007 the Nationals have experienced five leadership changes, with one caused by retirement.

So, we should not be surprised by the current upheavals in the federal Liberal Party with its incumbent leader, Sussan Ley, being under constant threat and now being challenged by Angus Taylor.

Indeed, that long running saga brings us to the issue about how leadership changes occur, some might say “managed” but that would indicate far more deliberate strategic action than would actually be the case.

How are leadership changes achieved?

Leadership changes can be achieved by several different routes.

One, and the easiest, is the current leader knows their time is up, resigns and bows out gracefully. This has the advantage of reducing internal party friction, is quick and avoids adverse media speculation – there might be some but generally it is not an ongoing saga. Menzies to Holt occurred in this way as did, as mentioned, the Downer to Howard change. One issue, though, there must be a heir apparent to convince the incumbent to stand aside. One of the current problems with the federal Liberal Party unlike the 1990s when there was the Howard vs Peacock competition, is that there has not been for some time just who might replace Ley? Also, there has been no certainty a change would make things better.

Second, a leadership change can be achieved by a sudden, unexpected coup with the rebels carefully and quietly cultivating support and choosing through whatever processes available, to bring on a spill. Andrew Peacock’s move against Howard in 1989 had all these elements. Turnbull’s challenge to Abbott in 2015 was also sudden leaving Abbott little time to respond. So too, had several of the recent aforementioned changes in NSW, SA, and Victoria.

Third, there is the leadership change by attrition – it is slow and increasingly public. Consequently, it undermines the incumbent leader’s opinion polling rating and so becomes self-fulfilling. The leader’s rating is declining so this testifies, according to the plotters, to the need for a new leader! Sometimes such leaders can end their misery by resigning or if willing to fight on. by bringing on their own “spill” by calling as special meeting and declaring all positions vacant. This can catch the plotters off guard. Or, as Turnbull did in 2018, the leader can evoke all the party room rules to slow down the plotters and in effect bring them into the open. Such leaders might still lose, as Turnbull did, but it can create a space where party members might consider who the replacement should be and to allow time for negotiation among the different “factions”. Hence, in 2018, instead of the original evoker of the crisis, Dutton, becoming leader, Morrison emerged as the eventual victor because of support from previous Turnbull adherents.

The current Liberal Party turmoil concerning Sussan Ley is certainly of this long burn, attrition variety. Little wonder the poor Liberal Party polling. Such long term leadership challenges distracts the party from doing what an opposition should – criticise the government and be the government in waiting. Ley has been subject to relentless attack. It has been so prolonged because, as noted, it has not been clear just who might replace Ley. The alternative power bloc in the party – the so called “conservatives” – have been split between Angus Taylor and Andrew Hastie, and neither evoke any confidence about whether the party’s prospects would improve in the immediate future.

It is only now that Taylor has emerged as the challenger but he might ponder whether in the painful journey to finally mount the challenge, the Liberal Party has been so damaged that any change in leadership will not make any difference to the Liberals’ prospects or even its very survival. Remember, Albanese can call an election anytime he wants.

References

Brown, A., The Myth of the Strong Leader, London: Basic Books, 2014

Davis, G., “Leader of the Gang: How Political Parties Choose Numero One”, Griffith Review, Melbourne: Text Publishing, 2011

Tiffen, R., Disposable Leaders, Sydney: NSW South, 2016