Fixing the Queensland Public Service or putting in a new political ‘fix’?
“We need a world class public service and I intend to make sure that we govern with a focus on delivering service for every Queenslander. And to those public servants I want you to know we intend to give vision and direction and leadership and advice will be fearless and frank, the culture of entrenched fear will be over and together we can deliver the services that Queenslanders deserve”.
David Crisafulli, leader of the LNP and new Queensland Premier, victory speech 26 October.
The task ahead
In Westminster democracies like Queensland’s, it is opposition one day, government the next, ready or not. There is no transition period as in the United States where the President is elected in November but does not take the reins of office till the following January. During that interim period incoming presidents work out whom they are going to appoint to their cabinets and the thousands of other positions.
So, promises and policies made by the LNP in opposition and detailed in its 100 day action plan now have to be delivered. That can only be done by the new government working co-operatively with the Queensland Public Service (QPS). It is for the QPS to: advise how to implement those policies; to draft the legislation; cost them accurately; explain what can and cannot be realistically done in the timeframes demanded; and provide the administrative processes and on the-ground-staff to deliver programs throughout the state.
Also, there were many areas where the LNP with its “small target” electoral strategy did not detail what it might do. Further, there are ongoing issues that will be adjustment. New ministers will need to rely on the current public service to help them develop new policies and to respond to issues as they arise in other areas.
Certainly, in these times, Queensland needs a “world class public service” to do these tasks, but what do we have now and what is a “world class public service”?
The problem - Queensland’s broken and politicised public service
The crux of the problem is that Queensland’s Public Service, like others in Australia, has after years of almost unbroken one-party Labor government, has become increasingly politicised[i].
We have moved from the Westminster system, with a permanent, career, independent public service, to a more American model where each new government replaces all senior roles with their own appointees – what is now called in Australia, the ‘Washminster’ system with some of the US checks and balances.
Queensland’s “Washminster system’[ii] involves:
Senior public servants are appointed more directly by the government of the day rather than by independent personnel processes;
Many appointees are laterally recruited and are partisan or have ideological sympathies with the government of the day – the now sacked head of the Premier’s Department, Mike Kaiser, a former Labor politician, party official and staffer, which sends the wrong message to the rest of the public service;
Most senior public servants are on contract and thus necessarily beholden to that government for their future employment – it results in an ‘over-responsive’ public service to ministers;
Senior public servants may be professionally qualified but are appointed because of their known sympathy to the government of the day such – these “merit cronies” see their role to further the government’s political, as well as policy, agenda; and
Wholesale changes to senior ranks with every change in government politicisation involves an ever-wider range of positions; across all aspects of government – with some are appointed to meet various identify quotas.
What are the consequences of a politicised public service?
It has meant a:
Loss of frank and fearless advice – the public service gives advice that ministers want to hear rather than the expert, professional and frank and fearless advice they need to hear;
High turnover of senior public servants with each change of government resulting in:
loss of experience and organisational memory;
deskilling of the public service and greater reliance on consultants;
Waste of time and resources as new governments take time to make the new appointments and the new appointees learn on the job what has to be done and what works and the inevitable bureaucratic restructurings they initiate.
All these factors explain why so many policies, programs, and infrastructure projects fail and end as expensive white elephants[iii] or policy fiascos[iv] achieving only part, if lucky, of what was promised.
The costly Wellcamp project and the 2032 Brisbane Olympic Games shemozzle with its many false costings and manipulated reports are just two examples of these problems.
The new LNP Government’s challenges
Premier Crisafulli has said in his victory speech that he wants a “world class” public service, but what does that mean?
That is great, but what a “world class” public service means has not been articulated in any detail in any LNP policy statements released to date.
Although Premier Crisafulli has indicated that most of Queensland’s Public Servant jobs are ‘safe’ this does not necessarily mean the senior ranks are. In that instance he is referring to the large cuts to the QPS across all levels that occurred under the Newman LNP Government (2012-15).
He has already stood down Mike Kaiser who headed the Premier’s Department because of his clear partisan background.
The issues are:
What is going to happen to the many other department heads and senior executive service public servants appointed by the previous government - is it going to be wholesale sackings of the senior ranks, the “now it’s our turn” approach to modern government?
Or is the new government going to embark on more lasting reform and try to reintroduce the Westminster model of a permanent, independent public service?
Learning from the Newman Coalition Government on what not to do
The Crisafulli Government has said it is not going to repeat the mistakes of the Newman Government (2012-15).[v] In case you forgot these include:
Wholesale replacement of most department heads many existing senior appointees were replaced by new LNP appointees - many from the Brisbane City Council where Newman had been Mayor;
Appointing former Liberal parliamentarians to department secretary roles and others with overt partisan connections and limited experience;
Appointing an Audit Commission chaired by former Federal Liberal Treasurer, Peter Costello, thus undermining its perceived independence, which led to wholesale cuts to the public service, enforced redundancies and whole areas of the public service decimated; and
Interference in the appointment of judges.
What the new Crisafulli Government could do
Hasten slowly
First, the Crisafulli Government should consider as we enter the November-December-January Christmas holiday period with its related distractions, not making major public service personnel changes or departmental restructuring of any kind if it wants its program to be implemented during this period.
Continuity and stability is essential. New ministers need time to come to grips with their portfolios and their personal staff to be selected.
So, many current senior staff should be retained as long as they are loyal to the elected government. Their experience and knowledge counts in this critical transition period. If balance, integrity and professionalism is to be restored to Queensland public administration it is also important that people are treated fairly.
Establish an interim appointment process and think about more lasting reforms
Second, in this interregnum establish a temporary independent, apolitical board to:
Review all senior positions and make new appointments;
Be headed by a person of stature, real public service experience and preferably from outside of Queensland and untainted by partisanship or any hint of ‘cronyism’;
Be unlike the Newman Government’s Audit Commission which was primarily an exercise in public expenditure cuts; and
Be the forerunner of a re-established statutorily based public service board (PSB), that in the past insulated the public service from direct political interference and restrained excessive bureaucratic fiddling. Such bodies were abolished across Australia during the 1980s and 1990s.
Avoid excessive policy, political and administrative centralisation
Third, avoid the trend of over-centralisation of government in the Department of Premier and Cabinet and the Premier’s Office.
While Premier Cristafulli understandably wants to make sure his ministers are tracking the right way and to overcome departmental ‘siloism’. The trend in government in recent years in Australia has been centralisation of decision making in the hands of the Premier’s Department and Premier’s Office. It causes numerous problems – duplication of the work and knowledge of line departments, interference in ministerial decision making, and it slows down decision making.
What is needed, however, is a small unit untainted by departmentalism or attachment to review government priorities, tries to get look at issues across government and to report to cabinet – not just the premier. It is hard to do, but there are examples that could be followed.
Consider reducing the size of the ministry over time
Fourth, consider reducing the size of the ministry. Under the previous government there were 19 ministers and 8 assistant ministers – a total of 27 – that represents nearly 30 per cent of the parliament or if the LNP procures 52 seats some 50 per cent of its members will become part of the executive. Almost everyone gets a prize. Cutting the ministry means fewer executive jobs to go around. At the same time, it allows the Premier to choose more carefully who joins the front bench and improves competition for positions within the government. It also sends a clear message to the public that the new government is not about ministerial perks.
Cull ministerial staff and improve selection processes and accountability
Fifth, under nearly ten years of Labor governments ministerial staff numbers increased dramatically as in other jurisdictions[vi]. Most such staff are partisan, often with little administrative experience, and usually appointed directly by ministers. A dangerous development and very much against the recommendations of the original Fitzgerald Inquiry, has been the growth in government and ministerial media units. So, before the ministerial staff appointment process starts, review staff numbers and have an independent selection process. In other words, set an example for the rest of the public service.
Revisit the Coaldrake Report
Sixth, outline the government’s position in relation to the 2022 Coaldrake Review of Culture and Accountability in the Queensland Public Sector. It made numerous recommendations to improve public service integrity. The previous government promised to implement those recommendations as did the LNP opposition. Progress has been slow. Surely, an important step in developing a “world class public service” would be a clear ministerial statement as to where the new government stands in relation to all the Coaldrake Report‘s 14 recommendations including its most controversial concerning the release of documents about cabinet decisions.
A final word – articulate a clear vision and state your principles
Premier Crisafulli wants a “world class public service” which is highly laudable. As issues about the public sector were not well outlined by the LNP before the election because of their “small target” strategy, it is now urgent that they should now be addressed. The Premier needs to articulate exactly what a “world class public service” means – what are the principles that underpin it, what are its practical manifestations, and how do we know when we have such a public service in this state? Otherwise, it is just business, or rather, politicisation as usual!
[i] Prasser, S., Politicisation - The Attack on Merit and Our Way of Life, CIS, August 2023
[ii] Aucoin, P., “New Political, Governance in Westminster Systems: Impartial Public Administration and Management Performance at Risk”, Governance, 25(2), 2012, 177-199
[iii] Gration, D., Kingston, B., and Prasser, S., (eds), White Elephant Stampede: Case Studies in Policy and Project Management Failures, Connor Court Publishing, 2022
[iv] King, A., and Crewe, I., The Blunders of our Governments, London: One World, 2020
[v] Jones, K., and Prasser, S., “ ‘Can-Do’ shies away from the principled path to government”, Public Sector Informant, Canberra Times, 1 May 2012
[vi] Ng, Yee-Fui, “Political Advisers in the Executive Branch”, in Oxford Handbook of Political Executives, Oxford University Press, 2020