Brisbane 2032 - Olympic-sized White Elephants

Last week Prime Minister Albanese flew into Brisbane to announce the Commonwealth contribution of $3.5 billion towards the $7 billion cost of the infrastructure for 2032 Brisbane Olympic Games.

This is $2 billion more than the original estimate of $5 billion - a 40 per cent escalation.

It is just one of the many cost overruns already starting that plague most Olympic Games.

Expect many more.

The Brisbane Olympic Games will be our own very big white elephant project – you know those projects that cost so much and deliver so little and serve no real useful purpose – which we can all see as it grows and grows in front of our very eyes.

And remember, Brisbane only got the Games because we were the only mug left in the international competition to hold this expensive sporting extravaganza.

Of course, we already knew that the planned rebuild of the Gabba stadium has blown out in just two years from $1billion to $2.7 billion – a mere 170 per cent increase – almost treble original cost estimates.

All for an extra 8,000 seats we are told.

Lest we forget the Gabba was redeveloped in six stages which was completed in 2005 at a cost of $128 million, with an additional refurbishment at a cost of $35 million only completed in 2020. Chicken feed in comparison to what is now on the table.

So if you think these will be the final figures for this stadium and whatever other pieces of infrastructure that is going to be built for these Olympics you are kidding yourself.

Promises that Olympic Games are bonanzas for host cities and countries do not hold up in terms of economic or other touted benefits.

Independent researchers highlight cost overruns haunt all recent Olympic Games.

Montreal, 1976: suffered huge cost overruns (estimated 720% cost over-run) leaving the city with $1.5 billion of debt that took 30 years to erase.

Barcelona, 1992:  left the central Spanish Government with $4 billion in debt (estimated 266% cost over-run), and the city and provincial governments an additional $2.1 billion in the red.

Nagano, 1998: The full cost of the Nagano Olympics will never be known, because the documents accounting for money spent on the Olympic bid were burnt on the orders of Nagano’s Olympic Committee vice-secretary general. It was vastly over budget and, as a result, Nagano fell into recession.

Sydney, 2000: The Australian state auditor estimated the Games’ true long-term debt was $2.2 billion. Australian officials predicted that tourism would quadruple after the Games, but there was no boost at all.

Athens, 2004: vastly exceeded its $4.6 billion budget. Assessment puts the real accrued debt of roughly $15 billion and contributed to Greece’s subsequent financial crisis.

Beijing (2008): Broke all spending records with an estimated bill of US$50 billion. Many elaborate venues such as the ‘Birds Nest’ have not achieved the hoped for legacy outcomes. In Beijing, few details were spared. Along Jing Shun Lu, a formerly dusty road in the capital's suburbs, the government spent $30 million for an Olympics facelift, including trees, flowers and an ornamental wall. The road is a secondary access route to the city's airport, and near the rowing venue. People who used to live along the road have been given a small sum in compensation and forced to move.

London 2012: Had a bill of just under $15 billion, 76% overbudget. The promised tourism and economic boom did not eventuate.

Rio de Janeiro 2016: estimated costs US$14billion - 352% cost overrun. The bid was made at a time of economic buoyancy and delivered at a time of economic stress for Brazil.  Professor Katia Rubio (University of São Paulo) concluded that “in the end, there was nothing else. It was a big boost that ultimately led to nothing”.  

Tokyo 2020/21:  The original bid committee estimate for the Games was US$7.3 billion (2013). The 2020, COVID-19, postponement alone added US$2.8 billion to the budget. Japan’s National Audit Board reported the final cost is likely to be more than US$22 billion.

And forget all the hooey about providing essential infrastructure for Brisbane.

Past Olympic Games show that it is a case of one big white elephant spawning a host a smaller white elephants in the form of  under-utilised and decaying facilities (stadiums, athlete villages) that were purpose-built for the Games but are not good for much else. This can be seen in Host Cities such as in Sarajevo, Athens, Beijing and Rio to name a few.

One of the unseen costs of the Games is the dislocation they cause people’s lives in the preparation and construction of huge mega stadiums and venues.

Another, is that they take our governments’ and public service minds off the more important tasks they were elected and paid to do – running the country and delivering services in an efficient manner.

Last, there is that basic economic rule called opportunity cost: if you allocate a large proportion of your finite resources to project X, there will not be enough for perhaps more urgent, important and value-adding projects, like hospitals or research facilities.

Remember, except for five years, Labor governments have held office in Queensland, since 1989.

They have cancelled important infrastructure like dams.

They have built expensive non-performing desalination plants.

They have built, at great costs, under-utilised quarantine camps during the pandemic.

The current Palaszczuk Labor Government cannot keep open enough maternity wards across the state, ensure our streets safe from youth crime or even, as an independent commission of inquiry informed us, run a forensic test laboratory.

So, how are they going to run the biggest sporting mega-event on earth?

Scott Prasser is co-editor with David Gration and Bruce Kingston of White Elephant Stampede: Case Studies in Policy and Management Failures (Connor Court 2022) and this article relies on one of its chapters. 

Book purchase here: https://www.connorcourtpublishing.com.au/White-Elephant-Stampede-Case-Studies-in-Policy-and-Project-Management-Failures_p_510.html